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Department of State

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MAY 9, 1957

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FROM: LONDON

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 6122, MAY 9, 10 P.M.

PRIORITY

USDEL DISARMAMENT 197

PART 1 OF THREE PARTS

RESPONDING TO THE REQUEST OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, CHAIRMAN USDEL FORWARDS AN APPRAISAL IN CONCRETE TERMS OF THE INSEPARABLE ELEMENTS OF A PARTIAL AGREEMENT FOR FIRST STEPS WHICH WE ESTIMATE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OTHER STATES WITH A SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR MILITARY POTENTIAL, THE USSR, AND THE UK. IT CONSTITUTES A PROGRAM WHICH WILL ADVANCE THE PRIORITY US OBJECTIVES AS STATED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

- A) TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MANY ADDITIONAL STATES;
- B) TO INCREASE THE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ATTACK UPON THE US;
- C) TO BEGIN TO OPEN UP THE SOVIET UNION AND TO OPEN EASTERN EUROPE;
- D) TO IMPROVE THE BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT AND SEPARATE NEGOTIATION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND EVOLUTION OF CONDITIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE, IN ACCORD WITH THE US NATIONAL INTEREST;
- E) TO GENERALLY LESSEN THE DANGERS OF A NUCLEAR WAR AND FACILITATE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.

IT WILL MAINTAIN VERY GREAT US MILITARY CAPABILITY.

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THE CONCRETE INSEPARABLE TERMS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PRESENT NSC DECISIONS AND PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE USDEL, AND DO REQUIRE SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS ON IMPORTANT ITEMS.

1. THE AGREEMENT FOR PARTIAL MEASURES WOULD INCLUDE SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FOR A SIGNATOR TO SUSPEND PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY THE COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS TAKEN, UPON WRITTEN NOTICE BY IT TO THE CONTROL ORGANIZATION OF EITHER AN IMPORTANT VIOLATION BY ANOTHER SIGNATOR, OR A WRITTEN NOTICE BY IT OF ACTION BY A NON-SIGNATOR WHICH PREJUDICES THE SECURITY OF THE NOTIFYING STATE AND THEREBY REQUIRES THE PARTIAL OR COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF COMMITMENTS. THIS PROVISION TO INCLUDE A PRECEDURE FOR ADVANCE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SUSPEND SO THAT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PRIOR CORRECTION OF THE ADVERSE CONDITION MAY BE AFFORDED.

2. ALL SIGNATORS (EXCEPT THE US, UK AND USSR) TO AGREE THAT THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM THE MANUFACTURE OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

3. THE US, UK AND USSR (STATES WHICH HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR POSSESSION ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TREATY AND WHICH CONTINUE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TREATY TO POSSESS SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS) AGREE THAT THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXCEPT

A) IN INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS IS OF SUCH NATURE AND MAGNITUDE THAT, IN THE DECISION OF THE USING STATE, THE ATTACK CANNOT FEASIBLY BE REPELLED WITHOUT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; OR

B) THE ATTACK INCLUDES THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR

C) IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DECISION OF EITHER THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

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4. THE USSR, UK AND US TO TAKE A FURTHER COMMITMENT THAT AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF AN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM TO VERIFY THE FULFILLMENT OF THIS COMMITMENT (ESTIMATED AS JULY 1959), THE THREE WILL DEVOTE ALL FUTURE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL EXCLUSIVELY TO NON-WEAPONS PURPOSES,

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AND WILL TRANSFER TO NON-WEAPONS PURPOSES ANY FISSIONABLE MATERIAL NOT ALREADY CONTAINED WITHIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES TO COOPERATE IN THE DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF SUCH A NECESSARY INSPECTION SYSTEM.

5. UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SATISFACTORILY FUNCTIONING INSPECTION SYSTEM AND THE CUT-OFF ON PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES; THE USSR, UK AND US WILL COMMENCE AGREED EQUITABLE PROPORTIONATE TRANSFERS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS IN SUCCESSIVE INCREMENTS FROM PREVIOUS PRODUCTION OVER TO INTERNATIONALLY INSPECTED AND SUPERVISED NON-WEAPONS PURPOSES, INCLUDING STOCKPILING, EITHER NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE TRANSFERS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT TO ONLY A LIMITED DEGREE AND EACH OF THE THREE WILL BE MAINTAINING A VERY SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY INSOFAR AS THE TERMS OF THE TREATY FOR THE PARTIAL AGREEMENT IS CONCERNED.

6. UPON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TREATY (ESTIMATED AS JULY 1958), THE USSR AND US AND OTHER STATES CONCERNED WILL MOVE PROMPTLY TO INSTALL AND BEGIN TO OPERATE AN AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROVED EISENHOWER METHOD IN INITIAL ZONES, INCLUDING

A) ALL (RPT ALL) OF THE SOVIET UNION NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE (INCLUDING THE MURMANSK KOLA PENINSULA AND DIKSON AREAS) AND ALL OF THE SOVIET UNION EAST OF 108 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE (FROM LAKE BAIKAL TO BERING STRAITS); AND AN EQUAL GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF ALASKA, CANADA, AND WESTERN US.

B) ALL OF THE SOVIET UNION WEST OF 27 AND ONE-HALF DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE (MINSK-ZHMERINKA LINE) AND ALL OF THE TERRITORY OF EUROPE BETWEEN 2 AND ONE-HALF DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE AND 27 AND ONE-HALF DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE AND BETWEEN 42 DEGREES, 20 MINUTES, NORTH LATITUDE AND 63 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE. (LABELLED AS THE RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN ZONE FOR CONVENIENCE IN THIS CABLE).

7. IN ADDITION, UPON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT,

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THE PARTIES WILL MOVE PROMPTLY TO ESTABLISH GROUND CONTROL POSTS IN SOVIET BLOC AND WEST WITHIN THE AERIAL ZONES, INCLUDING APPROPRIATE RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR ADDED WARNING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE POTENTIAL OF GREAT SURPRISE ATTACK.

8. IN ADDITION, GROUND CONTROL POSTS WILL BE PROMPTLY ESTABLISHED IN THE AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION WEST OF 35 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE AND IN THE UK AND AT THE EMBARKATION PORTS OF EASTERN US.

9. THREE MONTHS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT (ESTIMATED AS OCTOBER 1958), SIGNATORS WOULD FURNISH BLUEPRINTS OF MILITARY FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, EXCLUSIVE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

10. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING NINE MONTHS AFTER FURNISHING THE BLUEPRINTS (ESTIMATED JULY 1959), THE USSR AND THE US WOULD (IN THE MANNER OUTLINED BY THE US JCS IN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF OCTOBER 30, 1956) PLACE IN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED NATIONAL STORAGE IN DISARMAMENT DEPOTS 15 PERCENT OF THE MAJOR DESIGNATED ARMAMENTS REPORTED IN THEIR BLUEPRINTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES TO TWO AND ONE-HALF MILLION AND WOULD BRING THE LEVEL OF THEIR MILITARY EXPENDITURES DOWN BY 15 PERCENT.

11. OTHER STATES SIGNATORS WOULD MAKE SIMILAR (BUT NOT PRECISELY THE SAME) AGREED REDUCTIONS UNDER SIMILAR REPORTING AND VERIFIED INSPECTED CONDITIONS.

12. ALL SIGNATORS SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZE THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM TO VERIFY AND GUARANTEE IN THE CASE OF ALL STATES ALIKE THE FULFILLMENT AND OBSERVANCE OF EACH COMMITMENT, EACH SIGNATOR UNDERTAKES TO COOPERATE IN THE THOROUGH RECIPROCAL INSTALLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH INSPECTION, AND THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF SUCH INSPECTION IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE COMMITMENTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

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